Ok, this is a topic that I have wanted to sink my teeth into for a long, long time. The Pentagon is completely broken as a system and has been so for some time. While it is true that the military budget has always had problems, it has never been worse than today. To fix all these problems requires a complete transformation and the replacement of a number of personnel, mostly civilian. The three basic areas of change are in procurement of equipment, reorientation of resources and money, and the reorientation of manpower. I will begin with procurement problems and ways to fix them.
Since the beginning of the United States, the military has needed to buy weapons from domestic and foreign buyers. Today, we rarely travel overseas to purchase weapons and this does make a great deal of sense. We need an immediate and unbreakable supply chain. Going overseas will severely damage that chain. Recently, the military has encountered huge problems in procuring weapons systems. It is often the case that the Pentagon will spend billions of dollars and decades of development to get absolutely nothing. Let's look at some past successes and failures before turning to four current programs. Then I'll turn to a few simple suggestions to keep this from happening in the future.
One of the greatest success stories of procurement was the A-10 Thunderbolt II. It was the airplane that was almost not to be and succeeded despite not being wanted by the Air Force or it's designer. The story of this ugly duckling begins in Vietnam, where a WWII designed propeller plane called the A1 Skyraider was able to do what no jet could do. It could loiter over an area for hours, take unimaginable punishment, and carry everything but the kitchen sink. In fact, one did drop a toilet on the enemy as a joke. The Air Force wanted something to replace this airplane but the very nature of the design clashed with Air Force philosophy. Every plane the Air Force brought was high tech, flew high, and looked good. What they didn't want was a slow-flying tank buster and close support plane.
But the Army desperately wanted something like this, remembering how useful close air support was during WWII. And given the fact that the Soviet Union had more tanks than God, having a close air support plane that could kill tanks was something that was desperately needed. So the Air Force, persuaded by Congress and the Army, put out a contract. Two manufacturers put forth designs. Northrop developed the YA-9 while Fairchild-Republic developed the A-10. Northrop was supposed to win. They built an effective plane that had enough technology in it to make the Air Force happy, but could take some punishment. In fact, they designed the plane expecting to win.
However, there had to be a competition. After all, Congress said so. So, Fairchild-Republic was drafted to build a plane that wouldn't win. Everyone knew this going in. However, a few designers there had a good idea. They knew that this plane was supposed to be a cheap, low level attack plane that could take unimaginable punishment and keep flying while dishing out serious punishment. So, they found the biggest gun they could, the 30mm GAU-8 Avenger cannon, and built a plane around the gun. Everything was off the shelf. The engines came off the S-3 Viking program, the airframe had enormous strength in it, the gun was placed directly on the centerline, the pilot sat in a titanium bathtub, and the plane had absolutely NO high tech features. Pilots in the Gulf War flew with road maps on the knees trying to find their kill-boxes.
In fact, the A-10 that no one wanted won the contest easily. Fairchild had not planned on building the plane but suddenly they were handed a contract for hundreds of the planes. Once it was built, the Air Force tried to kill it. It was almost phased out of service in the late 1980s and replaced by a version of the F-16, but war intervened. The A-10 proved itself in the Gulf War and is still in service today. In fact, it will still be in service for some time because nothing can do the job it does as well.
Having looked at such a strange success story, let's turn to a current failure. The RAH-66 Comanche was supposed to be an armed scout helicopter for the US Army. It was fast, stealthy, and high tech. It also was in development for 16 years and cost 6.9 billion dollars. It first flew in 1996 and was canceled in 2004 because it had become "too expensive." It was supposed to be replaced by an entirely new design. However, that design quickly became too expensive as well and the helicopter the RAH-66 was supposed to replace is still in service. In fact, to cancel the RAH-66, Boeing and Sikorsky were paid $500 million or so. For well over $7 billion, the Army got not a single working airplane and is forced to rely on OH-58 Kiowas instead. However, some of the funds wert to UAV research and that has paid off considerably.
Having looked at one unlikely success and one total failure, I will now turn to four current programs; two Air Force and two Navy. The first two programs are the KC-X program and the F-35 JSF airplane. The two Navy projects are the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship. Only the JFS has managed to avoid a terrible development and procurement process.
The KC-X is supposed to be the replacement for the nearly 60 year old KC-135, a long range tanker aircraft based on the Boeing 707. The KC-135 is old and worn out. There have been several fatal crashes usually caused by a wing falling off. In addition, it spends over 20 hours being prepped and fixed for every hour in flight. Yet, it is the backbone of the Air Force and supports the US military across the globe. Work first began on a replacement in the early 1990s but was pushed back because it would take money away from the F-22 program.
Senator Ted Stevens tried to get a replacement in place quickly in the early 2000s by leasing 767s from Boeing, but it was stopped by Senator McCain. He stopped the entire project for several reasons, but there was a corrupt bargain in place to get the planes. The Air Force started up a competition and amazingly, a joint Northrop-EADS plane won. It was a variant of the A330, a European Airbus plane. This plane was bigger than the Boeing design, carried more fuel further, and it carried cargo as well. In short, it was a better plane in every regard except cost. It was slightly more expensive. And it was French, lets not forget that.
The plane would be built in Georgia at a factory EADS proposed to build and fitted out by Northrop using all American products, ensuring that no American military technology would get in the hands of the evil French. Boeing cried foul and the contract was re-written to make sure Boeing would win. Obviously, Boeing won and EADS cried foul. Heads rolled, money was lost, and no plane was built. Step forward 10 years and EADS gave up in disgust at the whole program for a while, leaving Boeing and Antonov, a Ukranian designer, to fight for the contract. In the mean time, more lives were lost and more money was spent keeping 60 year old planes flying.
It now appears that the Air Force will buy both planes, as the A330 design is better but the 767 is cheaper. Of course the 767 is nearing the end of it's life and the whole program appears to be a bid to save the production line. Either way, the Air Force will hopefully get some new tankers, but probably won't get enough and they are 20 years to late anyway. Before we look at lessons that could be learned from this fiasco that has killed people, lets look at the Air Force's other catastrophe, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.
The JSF was supposed to show that the Pentagon could buy planes and stay on budget. The planes we fly today are getting older and many were built in the 80s, designed in the 70s, to fight a threat from the 60s. Needless to say, we need new planes but new generation 5 stealth planes are very expensive. They need advanced electronics, expensive engines, and even more expensive airframes to become stealthy killers. The F-22 is too expensive to replace the aging F-15 and F-16 fleet, so something cheaper was needed. The JSF was supposed to cost a third of an F-22 and could be used by the Air Force, Marines, and Navy.
The two designers for the competition were Boeing and Lockheed. Lockheed had already won the contract for the F-22 and was the favorite to win. They had built some of the most advanced airplanes of the 20th century like the SR-71 Blackbird, the F-117 Nighthawk, and the U-2 spyplane. Boeing was the underdog, having last built a fighter for the navy in the 1920s. However, Boeing probably produced the better plane. However, the contract was changed and Boeing couldn't build the final version in time for the competition. Their final version was far superior to the Lockheed one.
However, Lockheed won and promptly messed everything up. The plane that was supposed to be cheap and on target is now massively over budget, costing near twice it was supposed to and is far behind. The general in charge has been fired and another has been brought in to get things running. Lockheed was massively fined for screwing up so badly and the whole disaster marches forward. More than likely, the number of planes being built will be cut and so the price will rise even higher.
This may be a strange idea. Normally, if you by less of something you spend less money. This is not the case will military projects. The B-2 Spirit is the best example of this. The first plane cost over a billion dollars to build. The entire plane was built by hand to see if it could be done. The second plane cost a little less and each plane after it cost a little less. Northrop figured each plane would cost around $100 million by number 50 or 60. Instead, production was cut at 21 and there are only 20 left after one crashed in Guam. The planes cannot be risked in dangerous airspace because no more can be built.
Having looked at two Air Force disasters, how can we fix these problems? The KC-X program has mostly been hit by scandal relating to inappropriate lobbying and political infighting. In one case, the officer in charge of signing the contract gave the whole thing to Boeing and then was hired by Boeing to build the plane. Senators Stevens and McCain fought tooth and nail over the whole thing, because Stevens upset McCain's anti-pork stance. The Air Force didn't want Airbus to win so they actually gave details of their proposal to Boeing to look over.
One thing that could have preventing many problems would have been to cut out the political fighting. By injecting politics into the process, the whole project ground to a halt. There needs to be checks and balances, especially dealing with the Pentagon, but currently Congress forces the Pentagon to buy weapons it doesn't want because the weapons will be built in certain districts. Military contractors know they can lobby congressmen who will push the Pentagon to buy their junk.
With the F-35, the whole program was supposed to work smoothly, but it has become a fiasco. In this case, it the result of over-reach. The F-35 is supposed to be three planes in one and replace many different planes. However, contracts are written in favor of the builder, not the military. There are few ways the builder can loose money. In fact, to cancel a failing program, the builder is paid more money. The military will often buy the product even though it is useless because it will cost less.
Instead, contracts need to be written far better. There will always be three stages and they need to all be carefully defined. First, the Pentagon issues a large competition. Many contractors will come up with design proposals. These proposals say what the weapon will look like, how much it will cost to build it, and how long it will take. Then, the two or three best designs will be funded to build one or two prototypes. Assuming they will be built on time and on budget, we move to step two. The prototypes will be tested against each other and the abilities of each company to build a prototype on time an budget will be factored into step three.
In step three, the winner is chosen and the weapon is put into final development and then production. At this step, the government is paying all the bills and the contract should be divided up into certain steps. As each step is met, the contractor will be paid. If they are on time and on budget, they may get a bonus. If they are falling behind, the entire project can be cancelled or fines can be imposed. In addition, the budget at this step will be set and cannot be changed easily. Military programs when Congress interferes. Some think that if a program is estimated to take five years to complete and cost $10 million a year, then by taking 10 years and spending $5 million a year, money can be saved. In fact, the program will cost more money.
As a result programs must be written in stone where the Pentagon can cancel a program for only two reasons. First, if the contractor fall far behind and budget or lies in an earlier step by inaccurately stating the capabilities, time, and budget of the weapon. Second, if time and technology passes the weapon by. It does no one but the contractor any good to buy a weapon that is obsolete upon purchase.
Next, lets look at two Navy programs. First is the DDG-1000, a real lemon of a ship. Next is the Littoral Combat Ship. DDG-1000 was supposed to be a stealthy super destroyer with a long range gun to keep Marine supporters in congress happy. It has turned into a super expensive disaster waiting to happen. It was to be a break from hidebound tradition and allow new ideas forth that would allow the navy to move into the future. The traditions it is has broken with include floating, shooting, steering, and moving.
It uses a hull form not seen since the Russo-Japanese War called the tumblehome design. When it takes on water, the ship sinks faster than normal. It pierces waves, resulting in hundreds of tons of water crashing onto the deck, flooding missile silos and ruining the expensive and sensitive electronics inside, and allows no one to work on the deck in anything less than perfectly calm seas. It has a reduced crew due to advanced automation, which means when it gets hit there aren't enough people to fix all the holes. And since it sinks faster than normal, everyone dies.
So, in summation, the navy is building a very expensive surface ship that wants to be a submarine and will kill everyone aboard to accomplish that goal. But why stop there? All the sensors, radars, and radios are located in one big central mast, which means they all interfere with themselves. This means we now have a ship that can't see danger ahead and will get hit because of that, probably won't be able to shoot back because all the missiles are water logged, doesn't have enough people onboard to fix all the holes and put out the fires, and will sink faster because of the poor hull design.
Who designed such a gem you might ask. Electronic warfare engineers and not actual marine architects came up with the idea and everyone who said it was a bad idea was fired. Actually, competent people who looked at it probably suffered a heart attack and never thought about it again as the horror of it all was too much to bare. Fortunately, the Navy is only buying three, which probably means one will sit alongside a pier acting as spare parts for the other two. Well, it will do that until they both sink in a moderate storm with all hands.
Since both designs have similar problems, let us turn to the LCS. Technically the Littoral Combat Ship but really the Little Crappy Ship. It weighs around 3000 tons, goes 40 knots, has the armor of a tissue, and the crew compliment of a Volkswagen Beatle. Because we are apparently bringing Sir Jackie Fisher back from the grave, speed is now life. Anyone remember how that one turned out? I seem to remember four ships blowing up and killing like five thousand people…
Anyway, the LCS goes 40 knots using the same engines that Britain will use to move the Queen Elizabeth class carrier, a ship that weighs 60,000 tons. As the LCS goes bouncing along at 40 knots, it sucks down fuel like crazy and all that bouncing damaged equipment on the ship. No worries, the undermanned crew and advanced automation will take of all that damage. At least until the automation breaks and the ship breaks in half.
As a basic idea, the LCS really isn't that bad. The only problems are that is goes too fast and weights too little. It has no armor and can't take a hit from even an RPG, something it will encounter in large numbers chasing down drug smugglers and pirates in small boats. It can land a helicopter very easily and that is its greatest advantage. In fact, the helicopter on LCS-1 has caught more drug smugglers than the ship itself has. However, it doesn't have the range to get around the world easily, which means all that great speed is useless. The whole project can be summed up with one quote from a young female officer. When asked what a 40 knot ship would be useful for, she paused for a second to think. Then she responded, "it would get my hair dry quickly after a shower."
What lessons can be learned here? First, have competent people design expensive warships. To be honest, that one should be obvious so I'll move on. While some of the problems are the result of congress, most of the problems can be laid at the feet of the Navy. The Pentagon doesn't know what it needs to do any more and runs around like an over stimulated dog from one shiny toy to the next. Oh, look at the stealth. Everything must have stealth. Oh, look at the railgun. Everything must have a railgun. Cool, VTOL is so awesome. We have to have a supersonic VTOL airplane. No one else does!
Having traveled through these horrors, lets look at what can be cut from the current budget. First up is the Navy. As much as I despise the LCS, it really isn't that bad compared to DDG-1000. Of course, a pile of dog crap shaped like a warship would look good compared to DDG-1000. That whole program can die an unlamented death, saving many billions of dollars and a few hundred lives. The Navy is building new submarines as well and they aren't bad at all. They can sneak in to deliver SEALS wherever the bad guys are, so keep them.
Next up is the Army. I'll be honest here and admit that I don't know that much about current Army programs. I don't think there are any after Land Warrior and the Future Wars thing died. We did get networked soldiers with a computer in their eyepiece, so bravo for that. I suppose the Army does need to work on a new helicopter seeing as the last two replacements for the OH-58 Kiowa were discarded. The Army budget can be cut somewhat, but most of it makes sense now. Leave Iraq and Afghanistan and you can cut the Army down considerably in terms of manpower.
Next, the Air Force. First to go should be our ICBMs. At least a lot of them are being removed thanks to the new START treaty but they are literally expensive holes in the ground. Split the strategic nuclear mission up between manned bombers like the B-52 and the B-2 and give the rest to the Navy. Our missile subs are quiet, deadly, and can look after themselves. The ICBMs cost way to much to operate with all the safeguards put into place.
Next, buy a good tanker for the Air Force. You'll save money quickly by not having to constantly repair a flying deathtrap. Buy more F-22s and force the F-35 program back into shape. Either it works or we go back to Boeing. Their plane worked better anyway. We do need a new bomber to replace the B-52s which are being flow by the grand-children of the original crews, but that can wait a little while. The new bomber concept is so cool I'd rather wait for it.
Finally come the Marine Corps. They may have the best PR of any of the branches but they serve the least good. Think about it for a second. What can the Marines do that the Army can't. The answer, storm a beach, Iwo Jima style. When do we expect to do this you may ask? The answer is of course never. An over the beach assault on China would end in tears for all involved. Attacking anywhere else seems kind of silly as well. Frankly, if we get mad enough that we want to invade, why not just bomb them until they give up? If they don't give up, we have nukes for that.
So, I would cut a lot from the Marines. They don't need their new Expeditionary Combat Vehicle, also known as the APC on jet skis. The V-22 is finally working and is actually useful, so we can keep that one. The F-35B is a turkey and isn't needed either. Frankly, the STOVL (Short Take-Off and Landing) version of the JSF caused the most problems anyway and can be cut.
By cutting all that and some more a decent chuck of a bloated budget is taken out. Next, lets look at manpower. The Pentagon uses private contractors for all sorts of things. If they need to build a base, they call a private contractor. If they need to supply a base, they call a private contractor. If they need to do search and rescue to recover a lost pilot, they call a bloody private contractor. Well, not quite yet but they are working toward that. Those private contractors cost a lot more than a soldier and really don't care about doing the job well most of the time. Remember all the problems with bases in Iraq courtesy of Halliburton and friends?
In addition to private contractors in the field, which can easily be solved by getting out of the field, we need to look at the Pentagon and it's bases. They are staffed by loads of civilian workers, not by soldiers. Lots of this is thanks to Robert McNamara, who managed to increase the number of civilian workers inside military from around 30,000 to 250,000 in just a few short incompetent years. Frankly, why do we need so many civilians working there? Have actual soldiers working there would save lots of time and money.
Finally, we don't need so many bases around the world. They build up hatred toward the United States whenever incidents happen and sadly, they do. By building up the Navy and Air Force, we don't need nearly as many bases. I doubt we will ever leave Germany totally, but we probably don’t need bases in Japan when Guam is nearby. We have Diego Garcia to watch the Indian Ocean and the Middle-East, and we own the Americas. The Army and Marines are pretty expensive to base overseas anyway, pull back and bomb people who annoy us. If they really annoy us, drop in some Marines or special ops guys and blow stuff up that way.
In conclusion, a great deal needs to be done to fix the Pentagon budget. First, stop unnecessary programs. Second, bring back a rational method of creating and controlling contracts. Third, pull out of regions and bases we don't need due to overlap. Fourth, cull back the number of private contractors. Mercenaries are bad. The Romans figured it out so we don't have to. Fifth, cut back the role of Congress in deciding what to buy. Sixth, remember that every weapon must be built for the soldiers who will use it, not the defense contractors who need to stay in business. Seventh, we have a shrinking budget and can't buy everything. Get rid of the stupid stuff. Finally, get rid of almost all ICBMs. Give the mission to someone who can do it better. Besides, the Russians liked Dr. Strangelove so much they actually built a doomsday machine and didn't tell anyone. We don't need all that many nukes anyway. Get rid of most through treaties and everyone is happy.
Doing all this will be almost impossible, but the result of not doing anything would be far worse. An Air Force joke is that in 2050 they will be able to buy three airplanes because they will cost so much. One will be in the Pacific, one in Europe, and one will sit at home. Let's not get into that death spiral. The British are sacrificing their entire navy for two carriers. By the time they are built, they won't have any escorts, supply ships, or planes to base on them. We can and must do better. China is.
